An in-depth exploration of whether all economies can catch up unconditionally or only under specific policy and structural conditions, including theoretical underpinnings, real-world evidence, and implications for investment decisions.
It’s funny—when I first studied the concept of “catching up,” I kept picturing a racetrack where slower runners eventually match the pace and position of the frontrunners. Economies, in many ways, can be compared to these runners. Some start off with less capital, weaker institutions, or lower levels of technology, and, according to certain theories, they should grow faster than more advanced countries and eventually “converge” to similar income levels. But, well, you know, life rarely proceeds in neat, linear ways. In this section, we’re going to examine the big debate around absolute vs. conditional convergence. We’ll dig into why poorer countries may (or may not) catch up fully with wealthy countries, highlight the role of institutions and policy, and share some relevant research findings that might inform investment perspectives or policy decisions.
Below, we’ll dissect the distinctions between these two core convergence theories, explore empirical evidence, and offer practical insights on how this debate ties into real-world growth outcomes. If you want a deeper understanding of the math behind economic growth, you might find it helpful to revisit some of the earlier material from this volume on growth theories—especially “8.2 Growth Theories (Classical, Neoclassical, Endogenous).” That said, let’s jump right in.
Absolute convergence posits that, over the long run, all countries will converge to the same per-capita income level, regardless of their individual characteristics. In a classic neoclassical growth framework, capital is believed to flow from high-income to low-income regions because the returns on capital investment are presumed higher in areas with lower capital stocks. Mathematically, you often see this in a Solow-type growth model where diminishing marginal returns to capital encourage faster growth in poorer nations.
A simplified version of the production function from the Solow model can be represented as:
where:
• \(Y\) is total output,
• \(K\) is capital,
• \(L\) is labor, and
• \(A\) is technology (or “total factor productivity”),
• \(\alpha\) is capital’s share of output.
In an absolute convergence scenario, if Country A’s capital per capita is significantly lower than Country B’s, one might expect higher returns on new investments in Country A. As capital flows into the poorer country, growth accelerates. The standard argument is that over time, the difference in income levels between rich and poor economies shrinks.
The diminishing marginal returns concept underpins absolute convergence. The intuition? If you’re a poor country with very little capital stock, each additional dollar or each new machine has a larger impact on productivity compared to that same additional dollar invested in a country that’s already flush with well-maintained machinery and robust infrastructure. This phenomenon suggests that poor economies could expand more quickly than advanced economies, “catching up” in due course.
So, does it always pan out that way? Critics point out that absolute convergence tends to assume away a lot of real-world complexities such as institutional quality, corruption levels, property rights, technological adoption, and even cultural attitudes toward innovation. Some countries remain stuck due to inconsistent policies or lack of adequate infrastructure—even if capital is cheap and theoretically abundant. This gap between theory and reality makes absolute convergence more of an idealized baseline rather than a guaranteed outcome.
Conditional convergence argues that different economies may converge to high income levels, but only if they share similar structural, institutional, and policy factors. It’s not the assumption that everyone ends up at the exact same per-capita income. Instead, each country has its own steady-state income level determined by its fundamentals: savings rate, population growth, educational attainment, legal structures, cultural values regarding entrepreneurship, and so on.
In the conditional picture, each country faces its own set of constraints and enablers—think domestic policy, social structures, and the capacity to absorb technology effectively. A lower-income country can converge on a wealthier country only if it aligns (or moves closer to aligning) with that wealthier nation’s “steady-state fundamentals.” If the low-income nation is drastically behind in education or hampered by growth-choking institutions, it may end up converging to a lower equilibrium or missing out on the catch-up altogether.
From a modeling standpoint, you might see multiple equilibria if some countries get stuck in “low-level equilibrium traps.” Others, with slightly better education and capital-labor mixes, keep forging ahead. This viewpoint acknowledges that capital and technology flows might not be frictionless. Spillover channels—like international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and immigration—don’t always distribute benefits evenly.
You’ll often hear about two popular metrics for convergence in empirical studies: Beta convergence and Sigma convergence.
• Beta Convergence checks if poorer countries (or regions) tend to grow faster than richer ones. Formally, we run regressions to see if there’s a negative relationship between initial income and subsequent growth. If the coefficient is negative, it indicates that countries with lower initial incomes are growing faster, hinting that they might be catching up.
• Sigma Convergence involves looking at the dispersion of income or productivity across countries over time. If that dispersion (think: standard deviation across an entire sample of countries) falls, it signals that incomes are clustering more closely and presumably converging.
Interestingly, you can have Beta convergence without Sigma convergence if variations exist in how different subgroups or “clubs” move toward their distinct equilibrium. One might see some countries forging ahead while others remain stagnant, resulting in persistent global inequality despite some subsets clearly experiencing faster growth.
Policy discussions frequently revolve around how to create an environment that enables a country to unlock the benefits of either absolute or conditional convergence. For unconditional catch-up, historically, experts have emphasized robust institutions—credible rule of law, strong property rights, minimal corruption, and stable governments. These conditions encourage investment and facilitate technology diffusion.
Take the example of technology. Even if a low-income country can import computers from richer nations, it might not experience immediate gains unless it also invests in skilled labor, organizes dependable power grids, and fosters an environment conducive to entrepreneurship. That’s why conditional convergence is so relevant. Countries that previously had structural deficits—whether in education or healthcare—often find themselves stuck in a “middle-income trap” if they fail to evolve their policy and institutional frameworks.
I still recall my first trip to a developing economy as a graduate student. I was expecting to see an explosion of technology adoption—faster data networks, brand-new factories—simply because capital returns were presumably higher there. However, I discovered that many local businesses struggled with basic supply chain management. Some were effectively skipping steps in the known growth model because the fundamental environment (road infrastructure, bureaucratic red tape, etc.) was not ready to absorb large upswings in capital. It was an ”aha moment” for me: the real world was far more complicated than the simple notion that cheap labor plus capital automatically equals massive productivity leaps. Yes, the seeds of growth were planted, but the ecosystem wasn’t entirely conducive to letting them flourish.
Countries might face myriad barriers on their road to convergence:
• Demographic Hurdles: Rapid population growth can dilute capital accumulation efforts.
• Limited Human Capital: Without education and training, advanced machinery and technology remain underutilized.
• Weak Governance: Corruption, lack of clear property rights, or political instability can deter foreign investors.
• Inefficient Financial Systems: Banks and capital markets that fail to channel savings effectively hamper growth.
Given these issues, absolute convergence can appear idealistic. Countries that address some or all of these barriers may shift closer to the scenario described under conditional convergence. And building these supportive ecosystems—education, stable policy, property rights—can take decades.
One reason some countries do catch up—at least in certain industries—centers on technology diffusion and structural transformation. Technology diffusion refers to how innovations spread from the cutting-edge economies to others in the rest of the world. When technology is relatively easy to adopt (for example, adopting mobile payment technologies that don’t require huge pre-existing infrastructure), you’ll often see bursts of rapid growth in previously lagging regions.
Meanwhile, structural transformation describes the process through which economic activity migrates from agriculture to manufacturing to services as an economy matures. This transformation can drive productivity; historically, the shift from agriculture to manufacturing significantly raised incomes in many Asian economies. But if a country shifts from agriculture to services prematurely (without developing robust manufacturing capacity), it may not realize the same scale of productivity gains.
Below is a simple Mermaid diagram to illustrate how technology and structural changes feed into economic convergence:
flowchart LR A["Technology Diffusion <br/>(FDI, Trade, Migration)"] --> B["Increased Productivity"] B["Increased Productivity"] --> C["Higher Growth Rates <br/>in Lower-Income Economies"] C["Higher Growth Rates <br/>in Lower-Income Economies"] --> D["Convergence <br/>(Absolute or Conditional)"] D["Convergence <br/>(Absolute or Conditional)"] --> E["Long-Run Income Levels <br/>(Steady State)"] A["Technology Diffusion <br/>(FDI, Trade, Migration)"] --> F["Structural Transformation <br/>(Agric -> Mfg -> Services)"] F["Structural Transformation <br/>(Agric -> Mfg -> Services)"] --> B
As the diagram shows, technology diffusion and structural transformation can create channels of higher productivity, accelerating lower-income country growth. Whether or not that improvement leads to absolute or merely conditional catch-up often depends on how effectively these channels are leveraged and whether underlying structural frameworks can handle the influx of technology and investment efficiently.
One interesting twist is the “club convergence” hypothesis. This school of thought proposes that only countries with a certain baseline in governance, education, and policymaking can break into the convergence “club.” Countries that meet these thresholds might converge strongly amongst themselves, while others remain trapped outside. You see something similar in regional trading blocs or among countries with advanced manufacturing ecosystems.
Spillover channels refer to the medium through which convergence might occur: trade relationships, cross-border capital flows, direct foreign investment, or knowledge sharing (e.g., diaspora networks). They act as highways of capital and expertise. However, if roads are blocked—for instance, if heavy tariffs or capital controls are in place—technology and capital can’t flow swiftly, limiting the gains from external sources. Even the best theoretical potential for absolute convergence might not materialize.
Economists often deploy growth diagnostics to figure out why some countries have trouble converging. This methodology involves systematically identifying the most binding constraints (e.g., poor infrastructure, insufficient educational levels, or limited access to credit) and focusing policy reforms on addressing those choke points first. If you’re interested in how governments prioritize their limited resources, the concept of growth diagnostics is particularly handy. Fixing those constraints can move an economy from “not converging at all” to a path of at least conditional catch-up.
When we look at real-world data, the evidence on absolute convergence is mixed at best. Early cross-country regressions by economists such as Robert Barro (1991) found that, after controlling for key variables (human capital, institutions), there is indeed some Beta convergence—poorer countries tended to grow faster over certain periods. But the “unconditional” story, ignoring institutional and policy variables, is much weaker.
In many cases, countries with higher savings/investment ratios and better education do exhibit faster catch-up rates—giving credence to the conditional convergence argument. Meanwhile, Lant Pritchett’s (1997) famous paper “Divergence, Big Time” points out that many low-income countries are diverging from the richest economies, not converging, unless they undertake significant reforms. And the ongoing debate about whether globalization fosters or hinders convergence continues in academic and policy spheres—even the effect of trade liberalization appears to be context-specific.
From an investment standpoint (especially relevant for those of us in the CFA Program and, hopefully, for folks who might manage cross-border portfolios), understanding the convergence debate can influence capital allocation decisions and risk assessments. Markets in low-income countries can offer higher potential returns if we assume they’re on a fast-track catch-up path. But, in truth, you should probably watch for signs of robust institutions, stable governance, and a proven record of absorbing technology effectively. That’s your clue that the economy is more likely to realize those above-average returns instead of sliding backward.
Asset managers often incorporate these macro-level growth expectations into their capital market forecasts. For more on forecasting techniques, you might look at “Chapter 1: Economic Analysis and Setting Capital Market Expectations” in this volume. Understanding a country’s potential growth path can inform equity valuations, bond yield expectations, and currency risk assessments.
The absolute vs. conditional convergence debate isn’t just theoretical banter—it’s a cornerstone in understanding global economic inequality, the potential for emerging markets to catch up, and the reasons growth patterns vary so widely. Absolute convergence envisions one big finish line for everyone, while conditional convergence sets different finish lines tied to each economy’s fundamentals.
If you’re prepping for the CFA exams, keep the following in mind:
• Be ready to apply these concepts in scenario-based questions—especially ones dealing with macroeconomic forecasting, cross-border investments, or risk assessments.
• Understand Beta and Sigma convergence measurements. They show up repeatedly in exam item sets asking you to interpret regression outputs or cross-sectional data.
• Familiarize yourself with institutional factors. The ability to differentiate between “everyone eventually converges” and “some converge only if X, Y, Z conditions are met” is an important skill.
• Watch for “club convergence” and related advanced ideas that might appear in an essay question.
• Consider how these ideas tie into policy: If the question revolves around recommending structural reforms or diagnosing low-growth traps, you’ll want to recall the insights from conditional convergence.
Hope this helps you lock down the fundamentals. As always, practice connecting these ideas to real-world data. That’s where you’ll get your “aha!” moments—and, trust me, those can be game-changers on exam day.
• Barro, R. (1991). Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
• Durlauf, S. N., Johnson, P. A., & Temple, J. R. (2005). Growth Econometrics. Handbook of Economic Growth.
• Pritchett, L. (1997). Divergence, Big Time. Journal of Economic Perspectives.
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